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INTRODUCTION
This case arises out of Union Pacific Railroad's (the "Railroad") occupation and
use of certain property located in Davis County, Utah (the "Property") which is the
subject of a land patent conveyed by the United States Government under the Preemption
Act of 1841 to Appellant Glenn Weiser's ("Weiser") remote predecessor in interest,
George Tomlinson ("Tomlinson"). Tomlinson established his preemption claim in 1869
by entering his Declaratory Statement of Preemption with the appropriate land office, in
the Utah Territory, and settling the Property. Title to the Property was also quieted in
favor of Weiser's predecessor in 1935 by the District Court of Davis County. The
Decree Quieting Title to such Property in favor of Weiser's predecessor, Steenblick, was
signed and entered by the District Court for Davis County. In 1870, by act of Congress,
the Railroad claims it received a grant of a right-of-way through the public lands (the
"Conditional Grant") in what is now Davis County. The 1870 Act required that certain
conditions be met within three months of passage of the Act or the conveyance would be
void. The conditions precedent required in the grant by Congress did not occur.
In 1982, the Railroad constructed a semi-truck loading facility on the Property.
Despite written demand from Weiser in 1987 that it surrender and vacate the Property,
the Railroad claimed that the Conditional Grant provided it a 400-foot wide right-of-way,
and it refused to vacate and surrender the Property. This case commenced in or about
1991 by Weiser, and culminated in the District Court's judgment against Weiser which
dismissed his complaint. This appeal was timely issued January 18, 2008.
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Weiser asserts that Tomlinson acquired an equitable ownership interest in the
Property by and through preemption of the Property in 1869, which occurred before the
Conditional Grant was made. Thus, the Property was not part of the "public lands" for
purposes of the Conditional Grant. Because Tomlinson had an equitable ownership
interest in the Property, the Property was not subject to the Conditional Grant which was
made after Tomlinson's preemption rights had been established. In response, the
Railroad asserts that although Tomlinson acquired a preemption claim prior to the Grant,
he did not submit the purchase price for the Property to perfect his claim before the
Conditional Grant was made in 1870. However, the Railroad's argument is misplaced,
because once Tomlinson's preemption claim was established, the Property was not part
of the "public lands" and was therefore not subject to the Conditional Grant. Tomlinson
completed his performance under the Preemption Act and the United States issued a
Patent conveying the Property to him. For this reason and the other reasons set forth in
Weiser's opening brief and this brief, the Court should reverse the District Court's
judgment which dismissed Weiser's complaint.
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ARGUMENT
I.

PREEMPTION REMOVED THE PROPERTY FROM PUBLIC LANDS
AND WEISER PRESERVED THAT ARGUMENT AT TRIAL.
a. Weiser Preserved His Preemption Argument by Proffering Oral
Testimony of the Davis County Surveyor and Presenting Documentary
Evidence, which was Approved by the Court as a Proffer.
Weiser preserved his argument before the District Court by proffering his witness and

documentary evidence that the Property was not part of the "public lands" at the time of the
alleged Conditional Grant because Tomlinson had preempted the Property. At the only trial held
before the District Court on December 8, 2005, Weiser appeared before the District Court with
his counsel, his witness (the Davis County Surveyor) and other documentary evidence from
public records. While Judge Page ruled that the evidence on the issue of preemption was
irrelevant, he permitted the proffer of the testimony of Max Brent Elliott, the Davis County
Surveyor, and other documentary evidence present at trial so that the testimony and evidence
would be preserved in the record. The Hearing Transcript reflects this event, in part, as follows:
Mr. Call: — make proffer with Mr. Elliott now?
The Court: You may
Mr. Call. Because we don't want to have to come back, your Honor, we just think that
Mr. Elliott has gone through this in great detail, and if we could go through and put this
evidence on the record, then it would be there for further review.
The Court: I'll allow you to proffer it in that respect
Hearing Transcript, Bench Trial, dated December 8, 2005, page 20. The proffer continued
through most of the trial. See Hearing Transcript, pages 20 to 50.
In addition to the proffer of oral testimony, Weiser proffered numerous exhibits which
the Court received and permitted as a proffer. The District documented the receipt of the
proffered evidence in the Court Docket as follows:
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Plaintiffs Witness 1, Max Elliot, is sworn and testifies. Plaintiffs Exhibits, 1, 3, 36 and
4 are received with no objection. Mr. Call requests to allow the witness to proffer history
of dealing with the land. The Court sustains Mr. Devashrayee's objection for relevance,
but will allow it to be proffered by the witness for purposes of the record only. It will not
be considered in the Court's ruling. Entry of the following of Plaintiff s Exhibits are
refused as evidence to decide the issue today but are only received and retained as part of
the record for the purposes of proffer of the history: Plaintiffs Exhibits 2, 6, 7, 8, 9,12,
19,20, 32.
See District Court Docket, page 30.
b. The Property Was Not Subject to the Conditional Grant.
The 1870 Act of Congress (the "Grant" or "Conditional Grant)1 specifically
provides that the Railroad's right-of-way goes only through the "public lands." The
United States Supreme Court has defined the phrase "public lands" as used in such
context as those lands that are "subject to sale or other disposal under general laws."
Union Pacific R. Co. v. Harris, 215 U.S. 386, 388 (1910). Therefore, the issue before the
Court is whether Tomlinson's actions in entering upon and settling the Property, and
entering his Declaratory Statement in the Land Office with the appropriate fee as required
under the statute which resulted in a subsequent land patent being conveyed to
Tomlinson, were sufficient to establish his claim to the Property under the Preemption
Act of 1841 (the "Preemption Act"), which precluded the Property from being part of the
public lands. The Railroad contends that until the full purchase price was paid for the
Property, title did not "vest" in Weiser's predecessor-in-interest (Tomlinson) and the
Property therefore remained part of public lands. Weiser disagrees and contends that
the Property was removed from the public lands through Tomlinson's compliance with
1

The 1870 Act of Congress (the "Grant," or "Conditional Grant") is attached to
Appellant's opening Brief as Addendum, Tab "C."
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the Preemption Act. Tomlinson fully complied with the Act by entering upon and
improving the Property, by timely entering a Declaratory Statement with the local Land
Office for the Territory of Utah together with other documents, by paying the necessary
fee he had vested statutory rights to the ownership of the Property. Indeed, once a settler
occupies and improves the land, enters his Declaratory Statement with the appropriate
land office, and pays the application fee as required by the Preemption Act, he acquires a
right of preemption in the subject property. As such, by complying with the Act, a settler
acquires an equitable ownership interest in land "of which he cannot be dispossessed of
his priority at the instance of any individual." Union Pacific R.R. Co. v. Harris, 215 U.S.
386,388(1910).
In this case, the facts are undisputed that Tomlinson (who was Weiser's
predecessor in interest) appropriately settled the Property and timely entered his
Declaratory Statement in the Land Office of the Utah Territory together with payment of
the appropriate application fee. These events occurred from 1865 through 1869 and were
prior to the Conditional Grant. (See Appellant's Statement of Facts, at f 16.) Because
Tomlinson had complied with the Preemption Act in making his statutory claim, he had
obtained an equitable ownership interest in the Property. The Railroad does not dispute
this fact but contends that the purported "attachment" of a preemption right was
insufficient to remove the Property from the public lands. The Railroad argues that
unless Tomlinson had paid the full purchase price for the Property, he acquired no vested
2

Weiser refers to and incorporates his Statement of Facts contained in his Amended
Brief, of record herein.
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interest in the Property and therefore the Property remained public lands. Weiser
disagrees. Weiser contends that Tomlinson's compliance with the Preemption Act of
1841 constituted a valid and lawful statutory claim to the Property which was duly
recorded with the Land Office in the Utah Territory and which remove the Property from
the public lands. A similar analysis occurs when a buyer enters into a land sale contract.
The seller holds legal title of the property until full performance of the contract is
completed. The buyer records a notice of interest with the recorder so that all persons
dealing with the property are aware of the buyer's claim under the contract. Indeed,
under the doctrine of equitable conversion, the buyer becomes the equitable owner of the
property (which is an interest in land) and the seller holds legal title only to secure final
performance. However, upon final performance of the contract, the buyer is the owner of
the land. Moreover, his interest is superior to anyone who purports to take an interest in
such property after the notice of interest or declaration is recorded. The same occurred
here. Tomlinson's claims and interest in the Property was duly recorded with the Land
Office in the Utah Territory well before the Conditional Grant was made in 1870. As
such, the Property was subject to Tomlinson's statutory claims. Tomlinson fully
performed under the Preemption Act and the United States properly conveyed the
Property to Tomlinson. The conveyance of the Patent related to the prior Declaration
recorded with the Land Office in the Utah Territory which was recorded before the
Conditional Grant to the Utah Central Railroad was made.
The Railroad strives to distinguish the case authority cited by Weiser in his
Opening Brief in support of his preemption argument by asserting that there is a
6

difference in the way the law treats an unconditional grant of right-of-way inpraesenti
(such as the Conditional Grant here) and a "checkerboard" grant, which carries
exceptions or limitations in regards to its application to lands to which preemption claims
have "attached" (such as the grants at issue in the some of cases cited in Weiser's
Opening Brief). The Railroad attempts to distinguish between an "attachment" of a
preemption claim and the actual "vesting" of title in the Property (i.e, when the ultimate
Patent was conveyed to Tomlinson). In other words, the Railroad asserts that despite
Tomlinson's full compliance with the Preemption Act, he lost his entire interest and
investment in the Property because the final deed (i.e. the land Patent), which was
conveyed to Tomlinson was conveyed after the Conditional Grant purported to convey a
right-of-way through the public lands. The Railroad makes this argument despite the
fact that the Declaration, fee and other documents filed with the Land Office of the Utah
Territory were duly recorded before the Conditional Grant was made.
In support of its argument, the Railroad asserts that unlike the case where a grant
provides for a "checkerboard" allotment of land to the Railroad limited by any
"attachment" of a preemption claim, the Conditional Grant was unconditional and not
subject to exception or limitation. The Railroad leaps to the assumption that in the case
of an inpraesenti grant of right-of-way, a perfection and full vesting of Tomlinson's title
was required prior to the effective date of the Grant in order to carve the Property from
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the public lands subject to the Grant.

Weiser disagrees and contends that legal case

authority holds otherwise.
The United States Supreme Court has defined the word "attached" in the context
of preemption and homesteading. Whitney, 132 U.S. at 362 (internal quotations omitted).
It does not mean "mere settlement, residence, or cultivation of the land, but it meant a
proceeding in the proper land office, by which the inchoate right to the land was
initiated." Id., 132 U.S. at 362-63 (boldness added). Further, and contrary to the
Railroad's analysis, the Supreme Court established the importance of the distinction
between a conditional grant (such as the "checkerboard" grants) and an unconditional in
praesenti grant of right-of-way (such as the Grant at issue here). In Stuart v. Union
Pacific R. Co., 227 U.S. 342, 353-54 (1913), the Supreme Court considered the
difference between an unconditional grant of right-of-way and a checkerboard style
grant:
3

By analogy the Railroad would argue that the buyer of land would not be entitled to
legal title to purchased property over a subsequent purchaser despite the fact that notice
of interest of the land sale contract was duly recorded with the county recorder and the
buyer fully performed the terms of the contract. Obviously, such is not the law. Rather,
the buyer is entitled to the equitable and legal ownership of the property pursuant to the
contract. Anyone else dealing with the seller has notice of the buyer's claim or interest in
the property because it was duly recorded with the county recorder. Similarly, here,
Tomlinson, through the filing of his Declaratory statement of Preemption with the Land
Office in the Utah Territory in 1869, gave notice to the world that Tomlinson was
asserting his statutory preemption claim to the Property in compliance with the Act. The
United States obviously recognized this when it conveyed the Property to Tomlinson
through a land Patent. Surely, a Patent would not have been conveyed to Tomlinson had
he not been entitled to legal title to the Property. However, he was entitled legal title and
the United States properly conveyed the Property to him through the land Patent.
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the former was without limitation or exception, while the latter was
expressly subject to the limitation or exception that it should not include
any lands which, although public at the date of the grant, were sold . . . or
to which a preemption . . . claim attached, at the date of definite location.
Stuart, 227 U.S. at 353 (emphasis added). Here, of course, the distinction is irrelevant
because the Property was not "public at the date o f the Grant because Tomlinson had
duly made his Preemption Claim which was recorded with the Land Office of the Utah
Territory before the Conditional Grant was made. Nonetheless, the import of the
distinction was that an inpraesenti grant of right-of-way took effect immediately as of
the date of the grant rather than as of the date of its definite location - whatever fell
within the public lands on that date was deemed subject to the grant. In comparison, the
lands subject to a limited or conditional grant were established by what lands were
deemed public as of the date of the road's definite location - not by what lands were
public as of the date of the grant. Accordingly, the import of a present grant of right-ofway (such as the Conditional Grant at issue here) is as follows:
We are of the opinion, therefore, that all persons acquiring any portion of
the public lands after the passage of the act in question, took the same
subject to the right-of-way conferred by it for the proposed road.
Stuart, 227 U.S. at 354 (emphasis added). Thus, contrary to the Railroad's position, the
import of the distinction between a conditional grant and an unconditional grant rests on
the timing of the effective date of the grant at issue in relation to the public lands - not
by whether a preemption right had attached or actually vested as of the effective date of
the grant.
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The United States Supreme Court has determined that, "lands originally public
cease to be public after they have been entered at the land office, and a certificate of
entry has been obtained." Witherspoon v. Duncan, 4 Wall. 210 (boldness added).
Thus, where a settler is legally entitled to enter the land, and receives a certificate of
entry, and as to which he ultimately receives a patent, "the contract of purchase is
complete when the certificate of entry is executed and delivered, and thereafter the land
ceases to be a part of the public domain." Id., at 218. In that event, "the government
agrees to make proper conveyance as soon as it can, and in the meantime holds the naked
legal fee in trust for the purchaser, who has the equitable title." Id. This premise applies
to preemption claims as well as to homestead and cash entries. Hastings & D. R. Co. v.
Whitney, 132 U.S. 357, 361 (U.S. 1889).
There is no question that Tomlinson acquired an equitable interest and statutory
claim to the Property when he appropriately settled the Property and entered his
Declaratory Statement of preemption in the Land Office for the Utah Territory in 1869.
Indeed, the Land Office's "acceptance of such declaratory statement... is the official
recognition of the preemption claim." Tarpey v. Madsen, 178 U.S. 215, 226
(1900)(boldness added). As such, Tomlinson's Declaratory Statement entered in the land
office, coupled with his legal entry upon the Property, were sufficient to remove the
Property from the "public lands."
A fundamental principle of the land system in this country is that "a tract lawfully
appropriated to any purpose becomes thereafter severed from the mass of public lands,
and that no subsequent law or proclamation will be construed to embrace it or to operate
10

upon it, although no exception be made of it." Hastings & D. R. Co. v. Whitney, 132 U.S.
357, 360 (1889). Moreover, where (as here) there is a "subsisting entry of record, whose
legality has been passed upon by the land authorities, and their action remains
unreversed, it is such an appropriation of the tract as segregates it from the public
domain, and therefore precludes it from subsequent grants." Whitney, 132 U.S. at 364.
Accordingly, based upon the acts undertaken by Tomlinson under the Preemption

[i]t would not be easy to suppose that Congress would, in authorizing
railroad companies to traverse the public lands, intend thereby to give them
a right to run the lines of their roads at pleasure, regardless of the rights of
settlers.
Harris, 215 U.S. at 391 (citations omitted). Further, and in regards to the principles upon
which the "munificent railroad grants" were based, the Supreme Court has stated that,
It is not conceivable that Congress intended to place these parties
[homestead and preemption claimants on the one hand and the railway
company on the other] as contestants for the land, with the right in each to
require proof from the other of complete performance of its obligation.
Least of all is it to be supposed that it was intended to raise up, in
antagonism to all the actual settlers on the soil, whom it had invited to its
occupation, this great corporation, with an interest to defeat their claims,
and to come between them and the government as to the performance of
their obligations.
Whitney, 132 U.S. at 364-65, quoting Kansas Pacific R. v. Dunmeyer, 113 U.S. 629, 641
(1885). Thus, in consideration of the intentions of Congress in passing grants to the
Railroad, and in light of the fact that the Property was lawfully settled and appropriated
by Tomlinson under the Preemption Act and because the Land Office passed on
Tomlinson's legal entry upon the Property, the Property was severed from the public
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lands as of the date of Tomlinson's entry of his Declaratory Statement on the official
records upon the Land Office for the Territory of Utah in 1869. Consequently, the
Property was not part of the public lands at the time the Conditional Grant was made.
As such, Weiser's predecessor was indeed properly conveyed title to the Property by the
United State's Land Patent and Weiser's interest in the Property is superior to any claim
by the Railroad.
The Utah Supreme Court has also indicated that only lands to which settlers'
rights attached after the effective date of the Grant were subject to it. In Moon v. Salt
Lake County, this Court assessed the Conditional Grant at issue here and determined that
"to the extent of the land included therein, [the Grant] operated as a reservation to any
patent based upon subsequently acquired rights, issued foi any portion of the public
lands across which the right-of-way extends." 76 P. 222, 225 (Utah 1904) (emphasis
added). The reasonable interpretation of the Court's statement is that the Conditional
Grant did not operate as a reservation to any patent based on rights acquired before the
effective date of the Conditional Grant.
In support of this interpretation, the United States District Court for the District of
Nevada determined that where a right-of-way grant to a railroad antedates a settler's
patent, it must prevail "unless it can be shown that the patent, in so far as it purports to
convey title to [the settler], is based on a prior equity." Southern Pac. Co, 257 F. 450,
462 (D. Nev. 1919). In that event, the burden of establishing the existence of a prior
equity is on the settler. Id.
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Again, there is no dispute that Tomlinson did in fact obtain a prior equity in the
Property by recording his Declaratory Statement with the Land Office for the Utah
Territory and by entering upon the land. This prior equity is also established by the
undisputed fact that the United States acted to convey the Property to Tomlinson through
its land patent in harmony with the Preemption Act.
The Railroad does not dispute that Tomlinson acquired his preemption rights
before the effective date of the Conditional Grant; but merely argues that the attachment
of Tomlinson's preemption claim or equity merely began the process of perfecting his
title. (Appellee Brief, at 15.) The argument is unpersuasive and illogical. A settler
would never want to undertake to settle upon land, spend years living upon the land and
making expensive improvements to the land while running the risk that all would be lost
if the land were conveyed away to another before the final patent was signed by the
United States despite the settler's full compliance with the Act. Such an event would
have resulted in a huge forfeiture for settlers and would have undermined the general
objective of the United States in having settlers homestead land.
c. Tomlinson's Land Patent Determines Title to the Property,
As stated above, the Land Office for the Territory of Utah accepted Tomlinson's
entry upon the Property and his Declaratory Statement. Moreover, based on those
prerequisites and based upon Tomlinson's compliance with his occupation of the land
and other requirements of the Act, President Ulysses S. Grant issued Tomlinson a land
patent to the Property in 1873. While "it is true that the decisions of the Land
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Department on matters of law are not binding" upon the Court, they are yet "entitled to
great respect at the hands of any court." Whitney, 132 U.S. at 366.
"The construction given to a statute by those charged with the duty of
executing it is always entitled to the most respectful consideration, and
ought not to be overruled without cogent reasons
The officers
concerned are usually able men, and masters of the subject. Not
unfrequently they are the draftsmen of the laws they are afterwards called
upon to interpret."
United States v. Moore, 95 U.S. 760, 763 (1878). "The action of the land office in
issuing a patent for any of the public land, subject to sale by preemption or otherwise, is
conclusive of the legal title." French v. Fyan, et al9 93 U.S. 169,172 (1876). Again, the
facts are undisputed that the Land Office for the Utah Territory accepted Tomlinson's
money as the final step in fulfilling all prerequisites under the Preemption Act and that it
conveyed legal title to the Property to Tomlinson in compliance with the Act. The acts of
the United States in conveying the Property to Tomlinson pursuant to his preemption
rights, which were established before the Conditional Grant was made, vested full
ownership in the Property in Tomlinson and thus the Conditional Grant had no effect
upon Tomlinson ownership of the Property. Therefore, Weiser is the owner of the
Property as a matter of law and the District Court erred when it refused to consider at trial
the acts of preemption undertaken by Tomlinson.
II.

THE RAILROAD FAILED TO COMPLY WITH THE CONDITIONS
OF THE GRANT AND AS SUCH IS NOT ENTITLED TO THE RIGHTOF-WAY OVER WEISER'S PROPERTY
The Conditional Grant contained express conditions precedent which had to be

performed by the Railroad for the conveyance of right-of-way to be effective.
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Specifically, the right-of-way was granted through the public lands "[P]rovided, That
within three months from the passage of this act, the [Railroad] shall file with the
Secretary of the Interior a map to be approved by him.55 (See Grant)(emphasis in
original). The Secretary rejected the map because it was not certified; consequently, the
Railroad did not file a map capable of the Secretary's approval until after the passage of
three months. For the same reasons as promulgated by the Railroad in subsequent
argument, that the Secretary's actions are "quasi-judicial" and should be protected from
collateral attack, the Secretary's action in rejecting the map should similarly be deemed
conclusive of the Railroad's non-compliance with that condition of the Grant. (See e.g.,
Appellee's Brief, at 22.)
The Secretary did not approve the second and untimely map but merely permitted
the map to be filed. However, the filing was not made within the time required by
Congress. Thus, the conveyance failed as a matter of law pursuant to the express terms of
the Grant. When Congress expressly provided that the Act would only become
enforceable upon certain specific events and those events were not timely performed, the
conveyance failed because the ability to alter or amend the conditions precedent in the
Conditional Grant rested solely with Congress. (1870 Act, at §5.) Indeed, the ancient
records obtained and presented to the District Court reflect that the Utah Central Railroad
hired counsel in New York in an effort to obtain some indication from the United States
that the conveyance was in fact effective despite the failure of condition. However, no
such approval or acknowledgement was ever obtained. The District Court determined
that the Utah Central Railroad had failed to comply with the Act and initially ruled in
15

Weiser's favor. Later, however, the Court reserved its prior order of partial summary
judgment and ruled that the Court was bound by the doctrine of stare decisis based on
rulings made by other courts despite the fact that Weiser was not a party to any of those
proceedings.
III.

THE SALT LAKE INVESTMENT CO. AND MOON CASES ARE
DISTINGUISHABLE, AND THEY SHOULD NOT BE DEEMED STARE
DECISIS OF THE ISSUES HERE

The facts of both Utah cases relied upon by the Railroad, Salt Lake Investment Co.
and Moon, as grounds for determining the validity of the Conditional Grant and its
priority over Weiser's claim to the Property are distinguishable from the facts and issues
of this case. Moreover, neither case should be deemed stare decisis of the issues
presented by Weiser in regards to his Property insofar as stare decisis relates to legal
doctrines only and not factual determinations. See, Salt Lake Investment Co. v. Oregon
Short Line R.R. Co., 148 P. 439 (Utah 1914), 246 U.S. 466 (1918); md Moon v. Salt Lake
C0>., 76 P. 224 (Utah 1904).
In Salt Lake Investment Co., the plaintiff in that action sought compensation from
the railroad (the Railroad's predecessor in interest) for the use and taking of property as
to which the plaintiff asserted title by virtue of a claim of preemption under the
Preemption Act. Contrary to the Railroad's interpretation of the case, the only reason the
right-of-way was determined to have priority over Salt Lake Investment Company's
claim was because the court determined that the plaintiff did not actually have title to the
land in the first place - not because of the validity and asserted priority of the Conditional
Grant. (Cf., Appellee's Brief, at 24.) Specifically, and similar to Weiser's claim, Salt
16

Lake Investment Company claimed an interest in the property under the Preemption Act
of 1841 as a result of having filed a declaratory statement and settled the land prior to the
time when the railroad acquired the right-of -ay by virtue of the Grant. In Salt Lake
Investment Co., the settler had settled the land and recorded its Declaratory Statement
before the date of the Conditional Grant, although the purchase price for the land was not
paid until after the date of the Conditional Grant. However, the similarities between this
case and Salt Lake Investment Co. end there. The property at issue in Salt Lake
Investment Co. was situated within the incorporated limits of Salt Lake City and therefore
it was not subject to preemptive rights under Section 10 of the Preemption Act. Because
the land was within the city limits, the Act did not apply and the plaintiff could not
acquire a preemption equity in the land, and the recording of the declaratory statement
and plaintiffs settlement upon the land were of no effect. Id., at 448-49. As such, the
court determined that it was a legal impossibility for title to the property to have been
acquired by Salt Lake Investment Company under the Preemption Act of 1841, despite
the fact that the land office issued a patent to Salt Lake Investment Company for the
property. It was on that basis alone that the court deemed the railroad's claim to the
right-of-way superior to the settler's claim, and only in regard to that particular tract of
land. Essentially, the Court found that the status of the land was unaffected by the
plaintiffs claim. "His claim was not merely irregular or imperfect, but was an
impossible one under the law, and so the status of the land was not affected thereby. The
land continued to be subject to the disposal of Congress and came within the terms of the
right-of-way act as much as if he were making no claim to it." Id., at 449. Consequently,
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the Court determined that no taking demanding of compensation had occurred. The facts
in this case are very different because the subject Property was indeed subject to
Tomlinson's claim of preemption under the Act.
In Moon, the rights claimed by the plaintiff were acquired after the date of the
Conditional Grant, 76 P. 224, 225, therefore that case is also distinguishable from this
action. Here, Tomlinson filed his Declaration with the Land Office of the Utah Territory
and other documents before the Conditional Grant was made. Therefore, even if this
Court were to determine that the Property at issue herein remained within the public lands
until Tomlinson actually paid the purchase price for the land, the Grant still does not
operate as a reservation to Tomlinson's patent. Based on this Court's prior analysis,
Tomlinson's patent is based on rights of preemption acquired before the date of the
Grant, and as such the Grant does not operate as a reservation to it. Moon, 16 P.2d at
225.
The two cases are important to this matter insofar as the District Court used them
as the basis to revisit and overturn its own ruling of partial summary judgment which was
originally rendered in favor of Weiser. By asserting the application of the doctrine of
stare decisis, the District Court determined that it was compelled to reconsider its original
ruling in favor of Weiser despite the fact that neither Weiser nor his predecessors were
parties to either case. The District Court rejected Weiser's contention that the doctrines
of res judicata and collateral estoppels were the applicable legal doctrines that the Court
should apply in determining whether the findings and facts and conclusions of law in one
case should be binding upon another. Weiser argued that stare decisis applied only to
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legal doctrines and not to the issues of claim preclusion (res judicata) or issue preclusion
(collateral estoppel). Furthermore, stare decisis does not compel the same application of
law when different facts are established in a subsequent case. If this were not true, a
plaintiff could establish binding precedent in an action in which proper defenses were not
raised. Such is not the law in this State. Rather, a party is only bound by the doctrines of
claim preclusion (res judicata) and issues preclusion (collateral estoppel).
IV. THE RAILROAD ABANDONED ANY INTEREST THAT IT HAD IN THE
PROPERTY WHEN IT QUITCLAIMED AWAY ITS INTEREST THEREIN
Even if the Court were to reject all of Weiser's arguments concerning Weiser's
ownership rights in the Property, the Property is still currently owned by Weiser because
the Railroad abandoned any interest in the Property when it quitclaimed away its interest
in the Property. The Railroad does not challenge that the purported right-of-way
conveyed by the Conditional Grant is subject to reverter. (Appellee's Brief, at 28.)
Under the doctrine of reverter, the right-of-way reverted to the United States upon such
abandonment and thereby vested with Weiser pursuant to the land Patent conveyed to
him by the United States. The Railroad rejects this argument and contends that no
reverter has occurred. Weiser disagrees because the facts are undisputed that the
Railroad purported to quitclaim any interest in the Property to another. The quitclaim
instrument executed by the Railroad establishes that the Railroad released and remised
any interest in the Property. Under Utah law, the underlying purpose in construing or
interpreting a contract or instrument is to ascertain the parties' intentions thereto. See
WebBank v. American General Annuity Serv., Corp., 54 P.3d 1139, 1144 (Utah 2002).
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Because the terms of the Railroad's quitclaim deed of the Property are unambiguous, the
Railroad's intentions to abandon the Property are clear from the plain meaning of the
instrument as a matter of law. See West Valley City v. Douglas W. Martin 2004 WL
2152196, *2 (Utah App. 2004) (citing ELM, Inc. v. M.T. Enters., Inc., 968 P.2d 861, 863
(Utah Ct.App.1998)). Thus, the Railroad's purported conveyance of its interest in the
Property manifested an intent to abandon its purported right-of-way under the
Conditional Grant. For example, in Barton v. Jarvis, 218 Ky. 239,291 SW 38 (1927),
the Kentucky court held that the act of the railroad company in attempting to convey a fee
simply title in its right-of-way was conclusive evidence of its intention to abandon the
ground for railroad purposes. See also Cannco Contractors, Inc. v. Livingston, 282 Ark.
438, 669 S.W. 457 (1984)(supplemented 282 Ark. 438, 670 S.W.2d 454 (1984).
In sum, when the Railroad purported to transfer any interest in the Property, the
right-of-way was abandoned and reverted to the United States. Because the United States
had conveyed the Property to Weiser pursuant to its patent, the reverted Property vested
in Weiser. Consequently, Weiser is indeed the current owner of the Property and the
District court improperly dismissed Weiser's claims for relief concerning the Property.4
4

Concerning standing to challenge the transaction between the Railroad and the UTA
during the course of the litigation, Weiser sought to join the UTA as a party in interest to
the litigation to resolve its interest, if any, in the Property. However, in an effort to
resolve the joinder request made by Weiser the UTA agreed with the District Court that it
would be subject to the District Court's jurisdiction and that it will be bound by District
Court's ruling regarding the Property that it had attempted to purchase from the Railroad.
See District Court's Docket Minute Entry, dated August 31, 2004, page 22. Based in part
upon the foregoing, the District Court refused to permit Weiser to obtain full discovery
concerning the sale transaction between the Railroad and the UTA.
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above and in Weiser's Opening Brief and based upon the
prior proceedings and record in the case, the District Court committed reversible error
when it dismissed all of Weiser's claims for relief with prejudice and determined that
Weiser had no interest in the Property. For one or more of the independent grounds
asserted by Weiser, Weiser is the owner of the Property and the Court should reverse and
remand the action back to the District Court with instructions that Weiser may proceed
with the enforcement of his claims against the Railroad and the Property as prayed for in
his complaint.
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